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TORT LIABILITY--Cunis v. Brennan, A Defendant Has No
Duty To Protect A Plaintiff Injured by Defendant's
Negligent Conduct Where Plaintiff's Injury
Was Not Reasonably Foreseeable
under the Circumstances
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Cunis v.
Brennan' should have an appreciable effect upon negligence law in
this state. The decision dealt with a so-called "unforeseeable plain-
tiff" and the nature and extent of the duty owing to such a plaintiff
from a defendant. Characteristically, the unforeseeable plaintiff is in-
jured as a result of the defendant's negligence but in an unusual and
unexpected manner. Just as characteristically, the resolution of the
unforeseeable plaintiff's case revolves around two legal concepts:
duty and proximate cause. These two. concepts are closely related
and at times merge into each other. Generally, the determination
of both the duty and proximate cause issues depends on the foreseea-
bility of the injury the plaintiff suffered. Because of this similarity these
two concepts have often been confused and subjected to misinterpreta-
tions by the courts. Indeed, some courts have treated identical negli-
gence cases differently by deciding one on the duty issue and the
other on the proximate cause issue. Prior to Cunis, Illinois courts
had interpreted duty broadly. Thus, most prior Illinois cases in-
volving unforeseeable accidents were decided on the proximate cause
issue. Cunis, however, was decided on the basis of duty; it restricts
the scope of duty and is a break with prior case law. Cunis' impact
on future cases involving unusual and unexpected accidents will be
to remove the plaintiff's case from jury consideration and to excul-
pate from liability a class of defendants whose negligence causes un-
foreseeable injuries.
This article will forward the proposition that negligence cases in-
volving the duty issue and unforeseeable accidents are decided to a
1. 56 IIl. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).
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great extent on policy considerations. The question usually asked is:
Whether the policy of the law will extend so far as to impose liability
for the unusual consequences which have occurred, under the facts
and circumstances of the particular case. The competing policies
comprising the answer to this question shall be weighed, and the
Cunis decision shall be reviewed in the light thereof.
THE Cunis DECISION
On December 15, 1967, Frank Cunis was a passenger in an auto-
mobile involved in an intersection collision in the Village of La Grange,
Illinois. Upon impact, Cunis was thrown from the vehicle approxi-
mately 30 feet to the parkway2 where his leg was impaled upon the
protruding remains of a drain pipe.3  The injury necessitated the
amputation of the leg.
Cunis, through his father as his next friend, sued, inter alios, James
Brennan, the driver of the other vehicle, and the Village of La
Grange.4 Count V of his complaint alleged that the defendant Vil-
lage was under a duty to maintain its parkways in a safe condition
and that it had failed in its duty toward the plaintiff by permitting a
dangerous, broken drain pipe to remain on the parkway.5 Count V
further alleged that the plaintiff sustained his injury as a proximate
result of the negligence of the Village. 6 On motion by defendant Vil-
lage, the trial court dismissed Count V for failure to state a cause of
action. The appellate court reversed, but the supreme court, in turn,
reversed, sustaining the ruling of the trial court.7
The appellate court, in finding favorably toward the plaintiff, ruled
upon two distinct questions of law. First, it determined, as a matter
of law, that defendant Village owed a duty of due care to the plain-
tiff." It recited the well-known maxim that a defendant municipality
is under a duty to exercise ordinary care to keep its streets and other
public ways reasonably safe for persons using them.' From this
2. An area between the sidewalk and the curb.
3. The pipe was described as sharp and rusty and either the remains of a gas or
water drain pipe. 7 Ill. App. 3d 204, 205, 287 N.E.2d 207, 208 (1972).
4. The other defendants were Waldo, Inc., d/b/a Waldo's, Waldo R. Koehler, Alex
Bodel, d/b/a Big Al's, and 0. Schneider.
5. 56 Il1. 2d at 374, 308 N.E.2d at 618.
6. Id.
7. Cunis v. Brennan, 7 Ill. App. 3d 204, 287 N.E.2d 207 (1972), rev'd, 56 111. 2d
372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974).
8. Id. at 206-08, 287 N.E.2d at 209-10.
9. Id. at 206, 287 N.E.2d at 209. As the court noted, the municipal duty to main-
tain public ways in a safe condition applies to parkways as well as streets and sidewalks.
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starting point the court held it would be "too rigid an application of
the concept of foreseeability" to hold, as a matter of law, that de-
fendant owed no duty to plaintiff merely because the latter's injury
was "uncharacteristic or unforeseeable."' 0 The court listed several
examples containing hypothetical plaintiffs whose injuries were dis-
tinctly probable and who therefore could recover as a result of the
defendant's negligence. The court reasoned that since a duty of
care was owed to certain plaintiffs, there was no good reason to deny
that such a duty was owed to the instant plaintiff. The court rejected
the defendant's contention that the municipality's only obligation was
to maintain its public ways in a safe condition for pedestrian travel,
and not as a "safe landing place" for ejected automobile occupants."
Second, the appellate court determined that a jury question was
presented concerning whether defendant Village's negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.'" Regarding defendant's liabil-
ity, the court pointed out that more than one inference could be
drawn from the facts presented. Since reasonable minds could dif-
fer, the court could not hold as a matter of law that defendant's neg-
ligence in allowing the drain pipe to dangerously protrude from the
ground was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury.'3 This was
a factual question within the province of a jury; therefore, the case
was remanded for trial.
On appeal, the supreme court based its decision solely on the issue
of duty. Taking this approach, the court had no need to address it-
self to the proximate cause issue. The court held, as a matter of
law, that defendant Village owed no duty of due care to plaintiff be-
cause his injury, although tragic, was so bizarre as to be unforesee-
able.' 4 The plaintiff had strenuously argued that an accident of
this sort was indeed foreseeable and, to demonstrate this point, he in-
troduced various statistics showing the high probability of a passen-
ger being ejected from an automobile upon impact with another ve-
hicle.' 5' The court, however, relying upon the authority of Dean
Leon Green,' 6 pointed out that plaintiff was using the wrong foreseea-
bility formula. The court distinguished the foreseeability formula em-
10. Id. at 207, 287 N.E.2d at 209.
11. Id. at 206-07, 287 N.E.2d at 209.
12. Id. at 208-09, 287 N.E.2d at 210-11.
13. Id. at 208, 287 N.E.2d at 210, citing Cohen v. Petroleum Heat and Power Co.,
44 Il. App. 2d 23, 194 N.E.2d 29 (1963).
14. 56 Il. 2d at 377-78, 308 N.E.2d at 620.
15. Id. at 375, 308 N.E.2d at 618.
16. Id. Mr. Green is a noted jurist and prolific writer. The supreme court cited
his article, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
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ployed by the jury to determine proximate cause from the foresee-
ability formula employed by the judge to determine the existence of
legal duty. x7  The proximate cause foreseeability formula dictates that
the jury merely take the position of the reasonable man and, looking
forward from the event ask only whether injury was likely to occur. The
duty forseeability formula, on the other hand, requires the judge to weigh
other factors such as the gravity of the possible injury and the cost
of minimizing the risk of such injury, in addition to the foreseeability
of that injury.'" Plaintiff's statistics may have satisfied the proxi-
mate cause foreseeability standard if the case had been allowed to go
to the jury, but they failed to satisfy the duty foreseeability standard
-the threshold which had to be crossed if the case were ever to
reach the jury.
In further support of its position, the court relied on the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts as applied in Mieher v. Brown. 9 There,
as in Cunis, the court was faced with a situation where the injury
plaintiff suffered was unforeseeable in relation to the risk defendant
created.20  In determining the issue presented, the court, quoting
from the Restatement, said: "looking back from the harm to the
actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary
that it should have brought about the harm for which recovery is
now sought."'"
Justice Goldenhersh dissented. He claimed the majority had con-
fused the questions of duty and foreseeability. 22  In his opinion, the
three questions whether the defendant had exercised ordinary care,
whether the failure to do so would cause injury, and whether such
17. In a negligence action, plaintiff must show the existence of a duty owed by de-
fendant to plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately resulting from that
breach. Furthermore, the duty issue, being a question of law, is decided by the judge;
but the negligence and proximate cause issues, being questions of fact, are decided by
the jury. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, p. 143, § 30; p. 289, § 45(4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
18. 56 MI1. 2d at 375, 308 N.E.2d at 619. See also Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d
611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
19. 54 Ill. 2d 539, 544, 301 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1973). Section 435(2) of the Restate-
ment (Second) provides:
The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another
when after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent
conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have
brought about the harm.
20. The defendant's position was that, whereas it may have been foreseeable that a
pedestrian might have strayed from the sidewalk, tripped and injured himself on the
drainpipe, it was unforeseeable that plaintiff would be thrown many feet from a car upon
the pipe.
21. 56 Ill. 2d at 377, 308 N.E.2d at 619, quoting the Restatement § 435(2) from
Meiher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 545, 301 N.E.2d 307, 310 (1973).
22. Id. at 379, 308 N.E.2d at 621.
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failure was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury were all ques-
tions of fact.23  Thus, he would have denied defendant Village's
motion and allowed the case to have gone to the jury. Moreover, in
addressing himself to the duty issue, Justice Goldenhersh took an op-
posite view from the majority. Duty was not to be limited to a
particular class of plaintiffs. It rather extended to all persons who
might be injured by a defendant's negligence even if they be unfore-
seen and unknown. 24  Since Justice Goldenhersh took as his starting
point the position that defendant Village owed a duty to the world
at large to prevent injury resulting from its protruding drain pipe,
he considered proximate cause to be the determinative issue.25
The legal problem involved in Cunis is familiar, but its resolution
by the courts has been difficult. In a case involving an unforeseen
plaintiff, defendant's conduct threatens harm, which a reasonable man
would foresee, to A, but instead harm results to B, who was in no way
threatened and who stood outside the zone of all apparent danger.2 6
Two schools of thought have developed concerning how to handle this
thorny problem, both of which can be traced to the famous Palsgraf v.
Long Island Railroad Co. case. 27  In Palsgraf, the railroad com-
pany's guard pushed a passenger aboard a train, but in so doing, dis-
lodged a package from the passenger's arms. In fact, the pack-
age contained, fireworks which exploded when they landed on the
tracks. The shock of the explosion threw down scales which struck
and injured Mrs., Palsgraf standing many feet away. Chief Judge
Cardozo, speaking for the New York Court of Appeals, held that even
though defendant railroad had been negligent toward the passenger,
it was not liable to Mrs. Palsgraf. As to her, the defendant owed no
duty because she was beyond the foreseeable zone of danger. The
defendant's conduct was not negligent toward her merely because it
23. Id. at 382, 308 N.E.2d at 622.
24. Id. at 379-80, 308 N.E.2d at 621.
25. Justice Goldenhersh also offered an alternative theory upon which to dispose of
the case in plaintiff's favor. He cited (56 -ill. 2d at 381, 308 N.E.2d at 622) section
368 of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS which provides:
A possesser of land who creates or permits to remain thereon an excavation
or other artificial condition so near an existing highway that he realizes or
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others accidently brought
into contact with such condition while traveling with reasonable care upon the
highway, is subject to liability for physical harm caused thereby to persons who
(a) are travelling on the highway, or(b) foreseeably deviate from it in the ordinary course of travel [emphasis
in Justice Goldenhersh's dissent].
26. PROSSER, p. 254, § 43.
27. 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). The literature on this case is voluminous.
For a list of articles concerning Palsgraf see PROSSER, p. 254, § 43 n.50.
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was negligent toward someone else; thus, Mrs. Palsgraf was the un-
foreseeable plaintiff.28  In this manner, Judge Cardozo limited a de-
fendant's liability for his negligent conduct. Judge Andrews, in dis-
sent, took a different view. He argued that each member of society
has a duty to protect others from harm. Once the risk of harm has
been created, the defendant must respond in damages to the one in
fact injured, whether or not injury to such person was foreseeable.
The conflict underlying the irreconcilable views expressed in these
two opinions, has never been resolved, and, indeed, the controversy
in Illinois has been revived by Cunis. This decision, at least in the-
ory, appears to align 'Illinois with Judge Cardozo and the Palsgraf
majority. Cunis is Illinois' Palsgraf. In order to fully comprehend
the impact of Cunis, a brief analysis of the nature and utility of duty
and proximate cause is warranted.
DUTY AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
The legal formula for negligence includes three fundamental con-
cepts: (1) the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) injury proximately re-
sulting from the breach.3" The absence of any one of these elements
is fatal to plaintiff's cause of action.3 The first component of the
negligence formula outlined above is generally termed the duty ques-
tion; the second, the negligence question; and the third, the proximate
cause question. 2 The duty and proximate cause questions are of
primary importance in cases such as Cunis and Palsgraf involving
unforeseeable plaintiffs. These two questions are important because
a court must rely on one or the other in making its decision. It
should be noted that in the unforeseeable plaintiff's case, the second
component of the negligence formula is usually not at issue because
in these cases some type of negligent act has been committed.
Duty
Negligence involves a breach of duty, and where there is no duty
or breach thereof, there can be no negligence. 3 Generally, all per-
28. Id. at 344, 162 N.E. at 101.
29. Id. at 349-50, 162 N.E. at 102.
30. Illinois Central R.R. v. Oswald, 338 Ill. 270, 170 N.. 247 (1930); Fugate v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 12 111. App. 3d 656, 299 N.E.2d 108 (1973).
31. Lasko v. Meier, 394 Ill. 71, 67 N.E.2d 162 (1946); Miller v. S.S. Kreske Co.,
306 Ill. 104, 137 N.E. 385 (1922); Bahr v. National Safe Deposit Co., 234 Ill. 101,
84 N.E. 717 (1908).
32. See Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).
33. Walters v. Christy, 5 Ill. App. 2d 68, 124 N.E.2d 658 (1955); Rokicki v. Polish
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sons owe to others a duty to exercise care to guard against injury
which may naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable
consequence of their conduct.34 Concomitantly, there is no duty to
anticipate a consequence which cannot reasonably be foreseen."
Whether or not such a duty exists is a question of law to be deter-
mined by the judge.3 6 The cases amply illustrate these general prin-
ciples.
In Walters v. Christy,3 T defendants were contractors employed to
make alterations to the interior of a building. Plaintiff was the owner
of an adjoining building. As was customary when, interior altera-
tions were being made, the windows were boarded up and a tempo-
rary solid wooded front was constructed preventing observation of
what was transpiring inside. Apparently, a burglar crept into the
building during working hours, hid there until nightfall, then broke
through the wall of the building being altered and into plaintiffs
building, and stole valuable property. Plaintiff sought to hold de-
fendant liable on the theory that the defendant's negligence in board-
ing up the windows, so that no one could see into the building after
working hours, was the cause of plaintiff's loss. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's complaint alleged
no duty owing from defendant to plaintiff. The court affirmed the
trial judge's granting of the motion. It did so on fundamental policy
grounds considering the nature of the construction business at hand.
The court pointed out that defendant's duty was to maintain the
building upon which he was working in a safe condition so as not to
injure plaintiff or his property. This duty defendant did not breach.
Furthermore, the law did not impose upon contractors a duty to pro-
vide police protection for adjoining properties. To extend liability that
far would be beyond the scope of public policy."
In Cronin v. Brownlie, 9 plaintiff slipped and fell on the icy side-
walk outside of the apartment building in which she resided. She
brought an action against her landlord and recovered at trial.
Nat. Alliance, 314 Il. App. 380, 41 N.E.2d 300 (1942); Campion v. Chicago Landscape
Co., 295 Ill. App. 225, 14 N.E.2d 879 (1938).
34. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 903 (1960); Hardware State Bank v. Cotner, 55 Ill. 2d 240, 302
N.E.2d 257 (1973); Lorang v. Heinz, 108 IIl. App. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785 (1969);
Garrett v. S.N. Nielson Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 422, 200 N.E.2d 81 (1964).
35. This is the Cunis holding.
36. Allegretti v. Murphy-Miles Oil Co., 363 Ill. 137, 1 N.E.2d 389 (1936); Lorang
v. Heinz, 108 Ill. App. 2d 451, 248 N.E.2d 785 (1969).
37. 5 Ill. App. 2d 68, 124 N.E.2d 658 (1955).
38. Id. at 71-72, 124 N.E.2d at 660.
39. 348 Il. App. 448, 109 N.E.2d 352 (1952).
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The appellate court, due to lack of precedent, considered as analo-
gous cases involving municipalities as parties defendant. 40  In those
cases, the law was well settled that a city is not liable for injuries re-
resulting from the hazardous conditions of its streets and sidewalks
caused by the presence of ice and snow accumulated as a result of
natural causes. This rule was based on the sound policy that it is
unreasonable and impractical to compel a city in the cold northern
climate to perform the labor necessary constantly to remove ice and
snow from its streets and sidewalks. Obviously, the costs involved to
Illinois municipalities in doing such work would be prohibitive
and furthermore, the liability resulting from such accidents would im-
pose an awesome burden upon local governmental units. With this
policy firmly established, the court extended the protection afforded to
municipalities, in ice and snow, trip and fall cases, to landlords whose
tenants had been injured under such circumstances.4 '
Policy considerations weighed heavily in the analyses and determi-
nations made by the Walters and Cronin courts. This should be ex-
pected; basically, whether a defendant will be held liable in a duty
case is, in the final analysis, "essentially a question of whether the
policy of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the
consequences which have in fact occurred."42  The outcome in Wal-
ters and Cronin would probably differ if the defendant were a com-
mercial establishment which maintained its premises in a dangerous
condition. Clearly, in such a case, the defendant would owe a duty
to its invitees to make the premises safe. In such a case the policy
of the law is better served by imposing a duty, and so the policy dic-
tates the result. In summary, the parameters governing duty are log-
ically coextensive with public policy considerations.
Proximate Cause
Succinctly stated, proximate cause is that cause which directly pro-
duces the injury or damage complained of.43 It is defined as that
which causes the injury or damage through a natural and continuous
sequence of events unbroken by any effective intervening cause.44 The
40. Id. at 452-53, 109 N.E.2d at 354-55.
41. Id. at 456-57, 109 N.E.2d at 356.
42. PROSSER, p. 244, § 42.
43. Seith v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 Ill. 252, 89 N.E. 425 (1909); Kerby
v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 28 Ill. App. 2d 259, 171 N.E.2d 412 (1960); Hartnett
v. Boston Store of Chicago, 185 111. App. 332 (1914).
44. McClure v. Hoopeston Gas & Electric Co., 303 Il. 89, 135 N.E. 43 (1922);
Kinsch v. Di Vito Const. Co., 54 Ill. App. 2d 149, 203 N.E.2d 621 (1964); Chapman
v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 340 Il. App. 475, 92 N.E.2d 466 (1950).
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issue of proximate cause in certain cases may be resolved in a sim-
ple manner, while in other instances the question may be more subtle
and the solution more enigmatic. In Ney v. Yellow Cab Co.,45 the
court was called upon to apply the rules of proximate cause to a
difficult factual situation. The defendant taxi cab company's em-
ployee negligently permitted his cab to remain unattended and un-
locked on a Chicago street with the motor running. A thief pro-
ceeded to take advantage of the situation presented. He stole the
taxi cab and, while in flight from the authorities, collided with plain-
tiff's vehicle. Since thieves are notoriously unpromising defendants in
civil actions, plaintiff sought recompense from the taxi cab com-
pany.
The determinative question in Ney was whether defendant's negli-
gence in allowing its car to remain unattended in the street was the
proximate cause of the injury which in fact occurred. In addressing
itself to this issue, the court took notice of the fact that there had
been many recent incidents of property damage and personal injury
caused by stolen motor vehicles.4 6 With this foundation laid, the
court gave its answer. The intervening act of the thief, which was the
immediate cause of the damage complained of, was not an unfore-
seeable consequence of the taxi cab company's original negligence.
Thus, defendant was liable. Its negligence was, in legal contempla-
tion, the proximate, even though not the immediate cause of plaintiffs
injury.4 7 The intervening act, because it was foreseeable, was not, by
itself, sufficient to take the defendant's negligence out of the se-
quence of causation.
Ney is an example of proximate cause being utilized to extend a de-
fendant's liability. Proximate cause, however, is not merely a plain-
tiff's weapon. Defendants employ the same concept to preclude in-
finite liability as a result of a negligent act or ommission. In Driscoll
v. C. Rasmussen Corp.,4" the defendant construction company allowed
a trash pile to accumulate at the work site. Among the scraps dis-
carded onto that pile were partially empty cans of paint. Plaintiff, a
7-year old boy, was severely burned while playing on the trash pile
when the paint ignited. The evidence showed that plaintiff's play-
mates caused the fire by taking embers from a nearby pile of burning
45. 2 M1l. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
46. Id. at 82, 117 N.E.2d at 79.
47. Id. at 82-83, 117 N.E.2d at 79-80.
48. 35 U1. 2d 74, 219 N.E.2d 483 (1966).
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leaves and throwing them on the paint cans. Plaintiff sued on the
theory that the trash pile was in the possession and control of the
defendant, that it was a dangerous condition attractive to young
children, and that this dangerous condition was the proximate cause
of plaintiffs injury. The court,, however, did not permit recovery.
It pointed out that paint, although combustable, is not inherently
dangerous. The children's conduct in igniting the trash pile was ex-
traordinary and unexpected. In legal contemplation, the children's
acts were unforeseeable and, therefore, defendant's acts could not be
considered the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. Even if defend-
ant's acts were negligent, the unforeseeable acts of the children broke
the chain of causation thereby relieving defendant from liability.49
SUBSTITUTION OF CONCEPTS IN DECISIONMAKING
Duty and proximate cause are not interchangeable modes of de-
cisionmaking in the sense that they are equivalent. But they are
substitutional modes of decisionmaking in that a court may utilize ei-
ther in its determination of liability vel non. Prosser maintains that
in many cases, despite the varying language of the courts, duty and
proximate cause address themselves to "identical questions."50  As an
example, suppose defendant is operating a crane constructing a
bridge and the boom of the crane accidently comes into contact with
high tension wires strung overhead, causing a current of electricity
to travel underground and burn a hole in a gas main, which, in turn,
causes a gas leak in a building many feet away, which finally causes
an explosion in that building which injures plaintiff."' Given this
factual context, it is immaterial to the ultimate resolution of the case
whether the court in giving its verdict for the defendant holds that the
injury was not proximately caused by the original negligence or that
defendant's duty could not extend so far to such an unforeseen plain-
tiff. This is necessarily true so long as the premise is accepted that
it is not proper for the defendant to be held liable for such a far-
fetched and improbable injury.
In a case involving the unforeseeable plaintiff, the duty question
must initially be determined. If defendant is found to owe no duty
to plaintiff, as was the holding in Palsgraf and Cunis, then defend-
49. See also Ray v. Cock Robin, Inc., 10 Ill. App. 3d 276, 293 N.E.2d 483 (1973).
50. PROSSER, p. 245, § 42.
51. This hypothetical situation was inspired by Radigan v. W.J. Halloran Co., 97
R.I. 122, 196 A.2d 160 (1963).
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ant cannot be liable to plaintiff and the action must be dismissed.
On the other hand, if the duty question is determined adversely to
the defendant, the court must proceed to the proximate cause issue.
It should be noted that proximate cause, as a legal concept, limits
what could otherwise result in infinite liability imposed upon a de-
fendant once it has been determined that he owed a duty to plaintiff
and that he breached that duty.52 The unforeseeable plaintiff's case
concludes when the question whether defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury has been answered. Liability
or non-liability is fixed by this final determination.
The significant difference between duty and proximate cause is that
the former is a question of law to be determined by a judge, whereas
the latter is a question of fact to be determined by a jury.53 Thus, in
any negligence case the trial judge decides whether a duty was
owing from defendant to plaintiff, while the jury decides whether
plaintiffs injury was proximately caused by defendant's negligence.
This distinction is of no slight importance in cases involving unfore-
seeable plaintiffs, given that the trial judge can either terminate the
litigation at any stage by ruling on the duty issue in defendant's favor
or can allow the case to be resolved by the jury on the proximate
cause issue. In a very real sense deciding whether the case will go to
the jury can be determinative of the litigation's outcome. 54  Moreover,
many courts have held that in cases involving unforeseeable plain-
tiffs, the jury should always be allowed to resolve the dispute under
the rules of proximate cause rather than having the trial judge non-
suit the plaintiff on a point of law.55 These courts believe that such
52. 7 Il1. App. 3d at 208, 287 N.E.2d at 210.
53. PROSSER, p. 289, § 45.
54. The fact that cases decided on proximate cause have liberally extended liability
in many instances may have been a factor in the restrictive nature of the Cunis decision.
The court may have feared that to allow the case to go to a sympathetic jury would
have been tantamount to imposing liability on the defendant. One case, City of Mt.
Carmel v. Howell, 36 Ill. App. 68 (1890), shows that a rather unusual result can be
reached when the case is allowed to go to the jury. There plaintiff's decedent was riding
in an express wagon when it was driven into an open excavation in the street. The jolt,
occasioned thereby, caused decedent to be injured in the small of her back. The injury
itself was apparently not serious, but unfortunately it led to spinal meningitis of which
the decedent eventually died. Despite the fact that such a consequence was only re-
motely possible, the court traced the line of causation, linking the excavation to thedeath, and held the defendant liable based on the jury verdict. The court made this deci-
sion in spite of a questionable understanding of the medical facts involved. The Mt.
Carmel case, although of little precedential value today, stands as an example of how
far a defendant's liability may be stretched under the concept of proximate cause. See
also Dellwo v. Pearson, 259 Minn. 452, 107 N.W.2d 859 (1961); Lynch v. Fisher, 34
So. 2d 513 (La. App. 1947); Ramsey v. Carolina-Tennessee Power Co., 195 N.C. 788,
143 S.E. 861 (1928).
55. Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theatre, 262 Wis. 229, 55 N.W.2d 29 (1952); Jack-
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cases present difficult determinations and that therefore the ultimate
decisionmaking properly resides in the province of the jury. The
most significant aspect of Cunis is that it denies all plaintiffs whose
injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable the right to present their
claims to a jury.
The substitutional nature of duty and proximate cause as modes
of decisionmaking is illustrated by three Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cases all involving the same factual pattern. In the first of
these, Wood v. Pennsylvania R.R.,56 plaintiff was injured when he
was struck by a body which was hurled many feet through the air
when hit by defendant's speeding locomotive. The court held for de-
fendant, basing its decision on proximate cause. The court said that
the plaintiff's injury was so remote that it was unforeseeable.5 7
In the second case, Mellon v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 58 plaintiff was
injured when defendant's negligently operated locomotive collided with
a taxi cab at a grade crossing causing the taxi cab to be hurled
against a signal post which in turn fell on plaintiff standing nearby.
Again deciding on the basis of proximate cause, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held for plaintiff; Wood was distinguished. The court
maintained that the pedestrian's injury was foreseeable. The court
said:
[T]he natural result of negligently running the train over the cross-
ing was a collision with a passing vehicle, not only to the peril
of its occupants but also of others at or near the crossing.59
The quoted passage all but overruled Wood despite the similarity of
the factual situations. Mellon effectuated a change in Pennsylvania
case law and probably a change in the ability of the unforeseeable
plaintiff to recover for his injury.
Finally, in Dahlstrom v. Shrum,60 plaintiff and decedent both
alighted from a bus. They then walked behind the bus and at-
tempted to cross the street. Decedent, at a point halfway across the
road, was struck and killed by an oncoming vehicle and plaintiff was
injured while standing at the curb when decedent's body, which had
been hurled through the air, landed forceably upon her. This time,
son v. B. Lowenstein & Bros., 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W.2d 495 (1940); cf. Goodman
v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 292 U.S. 98 (1934); Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74,
117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
56. 177 Pa. 306, 35 A. 699 (1896).
57. Id. at 311-12, 35 A. at 701.
58. 282 Pa. 39, 127 A. 444 (1925).
59. Id. at 44-45, 127 A. at 446.
60. 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951).
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basing its decision on the concept of duty, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held for defendant."'
Dahlstrom returned Pennsylvania to the Wood result, if not to the
Wood rule. As a practical matter Wood presented a hurdle to re-
covery in any case involving an unforeseeable accident. In the after-
math of Mellon, however, this hurdle was to a large extent removed.
Mellon expanded the scope of proximate cause, thereby affording
plaintiff a much better chance of recovery in the trial court. The
Mellon result certainly favors a class of plaintiffs who theretofore had
been constrained under the Wood precedent. Dahlstrom reconstructed
the Wood hurdle, but did so by employing a different rationale.
These cases indicate that the nature of proximate cause and duty al-
lows one to be substituted for the other where a court chooses to
reach a desired result.
Why the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Mellon and Dahl-
strom in the manner it did, rather than simply twice reaffirming
Wood, is difficult, if not impossible to answer. Yet, entering the field
of conjecture, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have been at-
tempting to achieve two goals. First, it may have been trying to at-
tain justice among the litigants. If this were true, then the equities
among the parties would have figured more prominently in the court's
decision than would have adherence to prior case law. Possibly, the
gravity of the various plaintiffs' injuries, their financial ability to
bear the same, the relative blameworthiness of the various defendants,
their ability to pay, and other non-legal factors entered into the
court's determinations.
The second possibility is that the court in each case may have been
looking toward the future with an eye to the impact each decision
would have as precedent. This follows from the premise that courts,
especially appellate courts, function not only as decisionmakers, de-
termining controversies among individual litigants, but also as law-
makers, creating precedents which will control litigation in the fu-
ture. Viewed in this light, one could speculate that the Mellon court
desired to allow recovery to an entire class of plaintiffs, i.e. unforesee-
able plaintiffs theretofore impeded under the Wood precedent, whereas,
the Dahlstrom court desired to protect a class of defendants theretofore
vulnerable under the Mellon precedent. 62
61. Id. at 428, 84 A.2d at 292.
62. The theory that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court may have been motivated by
one of these goals is suggested by Roscoe Pound's analysis of the nature of judicial de-
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The above analysis is as aforewarned conjecture, but it does form
a basis for an elementary proposition. Courts of law, in cases involving
unforseeable accidents, can and do base their determinations on extra-
legal factors. Indeed, Dean Prosser in his discussion of duty and
proximate cause, states:
Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has in fact
been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury, there remains the
question whether the defendant should be legally responsible for
what he has caused. . . . It is sometimes said to be a question of
whether the conduct has been so significant and important a cause
that the defendant should -be legally responsible. But both signif-
icance and importance turn upon conclusions in terms of legal pol-
icy, so that this becomes essentially a question of whether the policy
of the law will extend the responsibility for the conduct to the con-
sequences which have in fact occurred.63
Prosser's reflection is of fundamental consideration because, as will
be discussed herein, the Cunis court largely formulated its decision
upon its interpretation of the requirements of public policy. 4 How-
ever, before any ultimate conclusions regarding the Cunis decision
and its effect can be drawn, it is necessary to take an excursion
through prior Illinois cases dealing with unforeseeable accidents.
PRIOR ILLINOIS CASE LAW
In Cunis, the supreme court relied upon only one prior Illinois case
in making its decision: Meiher v. Brown.65 The reason for the ab-
sence of other precedents is plain; Cunis is clearly a break with prior
Illinois case law. For example, Wintersteen v. National Cooperage &
Woodenware Co.,66 relied on by Justice Goldenhersh in his dissent,
contains language difficult to reconcile with Cunis. In Wintersteen
a railroad improperly loaded a freight car carrying a consigned ship-
ment of barrels. A barrel fell and seriously injured plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the consignee, when he opened the freight car door to un-
load the shipment. The defendant railroad contended it owed no
duty of care to the plaintiff because there was no privity of contract
between plaintiff and defendant. In response, the court said:
It is axiomatic that every person owes a duty to all persons to ex-
cisionmaking. Judge Pound proposes that courts of law perform two major functions:(1) they decide controversies between litigants and (2) they create precedent for future
decisionmaking. Pound, Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940 (1923).
63. PROSSER, p. 244, § 42 (emphasis added).
64. See pp. 499-501 infra.
65. 54 I11. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
66. 361 I11. 95, 197 N.E. 578 (1935).
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ercise ordinary care to guard against any injury which may
naturally flow as a reasonably probable and foreseeable conse-
quence of his act, and the law is presumed to furnish a remedy
for the redress of every wrong. This duty to exercise ordinary
care to avoid injury to another does not depend upon contract,
privity of interest, or the proximity of relationship between the
parties. It extends to remote and unknown persons.6 7
Clearly, the scope of duty as enunciated in Wintersteen and other
prior Illinois cases68 is much broader than that announced in Cunis.
Indeed, the underlying principles in Wintersteen are in accord with
Judge Andrews' rationale in Palsgraf.
In general, however, Wintersteen notwithstanding, the issue in prior
Illinois cases dealing with situations like that in Cunis has been
phrased in terms of proximate cause rather than duty.69 For exam-
ple, in City of Rock Falls v. Wells, 0 plaintiff, riding in a horse drawn
sleigh, was travelling east on a public thoroughfare when she was
confronted by a runaway horse and buggy coming west on the same
side of the street. In order to avoid the impending harm, plaintiff
attempted to cross to the other side of the street, but her sleigh
caught on a raised portion of unused railway tracks. Being unable
to move, plaintiff was struck and injured by the runaway. The de-
fendant municipality admitted that the tracks were an obstruction to
travel, but maintained that their negligence was not the proximate
cause of plaintiff's injury. In holding against the municipality, the
court said:
[I]f a plaintiff, while observing due care for 'his personal safety,
was injured by the combined result of an accident and the negli-
gence of a city or village, and without such negligence the injury
would not have occurred, the city or village will be held liable,
although the accident be the primary cause of the injury, if the
67. Id. at 103, 197 N.E. at 582 (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., Kahn v. James Burton Co., 5 Ill. 2d 614, 126 N.E.2d 836 (1955),
where a lumber company was held liable for injuries to children playing on a construc-
tion site when lumber which the company had negligently piled fell and injured the chil-
dren. The appellate court had held as a matter of law that the defendant was not guilty
of negligence because it had no duty to guard or protect the construction site of which
it was not in possession or control. The supreme court reversed, quoting from Winter-
steen. Accord, Bangert v. Nolan, 130 11. App. 2d 860, 265 N.E.2d 199 (1970); Rodgers
v. Meyers & Smith, Inc., 57 Ill. App. 2d 200, 206 N.E.2d 845 (1965); Garrett v. S.N.
Neilson Co., 49 Ill. App. 2d 422, 200 N.E.2d 81 (1964).
69. As Prosser points out, the Palsgraf-Cunis type problem has been dealt with many
times before with some courts analyzing in terms of duty and others in terms of prox-
imate cause. PROSSER, p. 254, § 43. Compare Wood v. Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa.
306, 35 A. 699 (1896) with Dahlstrom v. Shrum, 368 Pa. 423, 84 A.2d 289 (1951).
Seepp. 493-94 supra.
70. 169 fI1. 224, 48 N.E. 440 (1897).
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consequences could, with common prudence and sagacity, have
been seen and provided against by such city or village. 71
Rock Falls, unlike Cunis, held the municipality liable for permitting a
dangerous condition to persist on its streets. The municipality was
viewed as the original wrongdoer whose obligation was to respond to
the one injured even though the negligence of a third party had inter-
vened.7 1
The court in Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. 73 addressed itself to
the foreseeability of a plaintiff's injury. Plaintiff, a young woman,
was assaulted and molested by a vagrant while waiting for a train at
defendant's railroad station. The station was within the vicinity of a
so-called "hobo jungle" where idle and dissolute people congregated.
At the trial, the evidence showed that tramps and hoboes were often
seen loitering at or near the railroad station. Defendant railroad
contended that it had no notice or knowledge that plaintiff might be
assaulted, and that it could not be required to guard against injuries
resulting from such unusual occurrences which could not have been
reasonably anticipated. The court, however, rejected this argument
holding that the assault was foreseeable since unsavory characters
were known to frequent the vicinity of the station.74
Having formulated a liberal foreseeability test, the court employed
it to defeat another of defendant's contentions. That contention was
that the criminal act of the tramp was an intervening cause breaking
the chain of causation, and that therefore defendant's negligence was
not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. The court said that if the
71. Id. at 227, 48 N.E. at 440. Moreover, in a passage applicable to Cunis, the court
said:
[Plaintiff] was in effect imprisoned and held in place and under circumstances
of imminent danger by the obstruction in the street, so that she was unable
to avoid the injury which she could have avoided had the street been in a rea-
sonably safe condition ....
169 Ill. at 227, 48 N.E. at 442.
72. Another case with facts similar to Cunis but holding for plaintiff is Weick v.
Lander, 75 Ill. 93 (1874). There, a contractor had obstructed a public street by piling
thereon a large lot of bricks. Because of this obstruction, an accident ensued causing
the death of plaintiffs intestate. The defendant argued that the accident was caused
by the negligence of one of the drivers of the wagons involved in the collision. The
court flatly rejected this view and focused on the original obstruction of the street by
defendant, holding that to be an unlawful act in itself. The court then said:
We understand the rule to be, that where an act done is unlawful in itself,
the wrongdoer will be held responsible, although other causes may have subse-
quently arisen and contributed in producing the injury; that where an act un-
lawful in itself is done, from which a injury may reasonably and naturally be
expected to result, the injury, when it occurs, will be traced back and visited
upon the original wrongdoer.
Id. at 96.
73. 383 Ill. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943).
74. Id. at 376-77, 50 N.E.2d at 502.
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intervening cause could reasonably have been anticipated, the first
negligent act would be considered the proximate cause of the injury."5
Distinct from Wintersteen, Wells, and Neering is Mieher v. Brown,"6
the one case relied on by the supreme court in deciding Cunis. The
facts in Mieher were not analogous to those of Cunis, but in this case
the duty issue also was paramount. Kathryn Mieher was killed when
the automobile she was driving collided with the right rear corner of
a large truck. Her administrator sued the manufacturer of the
truck, alleging it had been negligently designed because there were no
bumper guards or shield on the rear of the truck. In its decision the
court addressed itself to the duty issue only. It held the defendant
manufacturer not liable because the alleged defective design created
no unreasonable risk of injury. Plaintiff's injury was unforesee-
able and defendant had no duty to guard against it. Thus, plaintiff's
case was not allowed to go to the jury because the complaint failed
to state a cause of action.
In deciding Mieher, the supreme court was faced with two con-
flicting lines of cases involving so called "second accident" injuries.
Such injuries occur when a victim is thrown against the interior of
the passenger compartment after his vehicle has first collided with
an external object. These cases have caused a split in the federal
circuits and varying results in the state courts.7 7  It should be noted
that the factual situations involved in the second collision cases have
little or no resemblance to Cunis. Invariably, the second accident
75. Id. at 381, 50 N.E.2d at 504.
76. 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973).
77. No liability: Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.) cert. de-
nied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966); General Motors Corp. v. Howard, 244 So. 2d 726 (Miss.
S. Ct. 1971); Edgar v. Nachman, 37 A.D.2d 86, 323 N.Y.S.2d 53 (1971). Liability:
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Mickle v. Blackmon,
252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). The leading case in the area from the defendant
manufacturer's point of view is Evans. In that case plaintiff's decedent was killed when
his car was broadsided by another vehicle at an intersection. The car in which decedent
was riding was constructed with an "X" frame rather than a "perimeter" frame used in
other vehicles. Plaintiff's theory was that defendant manufacturer had breached its duty
to the user of its product because it realized that the "X" frame was not as safe as the
alternative model. The court rejected this argument, holding instead that a manufac-
turer is under no duty to make his vehicle accident-proof, nor must he render the vehicle
more safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all. A key to the holding was
that there was no allegation that decedent's death would have been avoided even if de-
fendant had constructed its product using the perimeter frame. A contrary position was
taken in Larsen. In that case plaintiff was injured in a head-on collision when the steer-
ing mechanism which was allegedly negligently designed was thrust into plaintiff's head.
The Larsen court, unlike Evans, held that automobile collisions are an "inevitable con-
tingency of normal automobile use" and that "where the manufacturer's negligence in
design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its product, the man-
ufacturer should be liable for the injury caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care
in the design." 391 F.2d at 502.
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cases involve the defective designs of vehicle interiors-an issue not at
all present in Cunis. On the other hand, injuries resulting from hit-
ting the interior of a car are more foreseeable than those sustained
by being thrown through the air and hitting a pipe. This fact tends
to support the court's reliance on Mieher. On balance, Mieher is not a
convincing precedent upon which to rest the Cunis holding due to its
factual dissimilarities.
Mieher, however, did take the plaintiffs case from the jury. In-
deed the common denominator or Mieher and Cunis is that both em-
ploy the duty concept to deny plaintiff a jury trial. Wintersteen and
its progeny had interpreted duty broadly. Had the Cunis court em-
ployed the Wintersteen rationale, an opposite result would have been
reached. By not following Wintersteen the supreme court is indicat-
ing that it is taking a new approach to the duty question in negli-
gence cases. Mieher and Cunis, when taken together, manifest the
proposition that in the future the supreme court will take a circum-
spect view of injury claims made by plaintiffs whose accidents were
unexpected and bizarre.
THE PUBLIC POLICY ASPECT
Roscoe Pound, the noted jurist, maintained that courts of law per-
form two functions. 8 They decide individual cases between litigants
and they create precedent for future decisionmaking. In performing
these functions, courts can draw on a wide range of legal precepts
and rules. In any but the very simplest of controversies, a court will
have a choice to base its determination on one of two or more of
these, in effect, competing rules. The Cunis case provides an example
of this common component of judicial decisionmaking. The supreme
court could have made its decision on the grounds of proximate cause
or duty. A court will often choose one rule over another in order to
promote a larger public policy which lies hidden by the legal rule
employed in the court's opinion. In these circumstances, the public
policy is the overriding basis for the decision.
Public policy played an important role in Cunis. The court had to
determine whether it would extend liability in the unforeseeable plain-
tiffs case to the injuries which in fact occurred. In making this de-
termination, the court's consideration of public policy was a para-
mount factor. As stated by Justice McGloon at the appellate level,
78. Pound, supra note 62, at 941, 945.
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the word "duty is not sacred. It is simply a word by which we state
a conclusion as to whether or not the plaintiff's interests are to be
afforded protection against the defendant's negligence. ' 79  Prosser
concurs with this analysis when he says the duty question is "one of
the fundamental policy of the law, as to whether the defendant's re-
sponsibility should extend to such results."80
A close reading of the court's opinion in Cunis reveals an intention
to eliminate recoveries obtained by a class of plaintiffs whose injuries,
in the court's view, just do not merit recompense, i.e. those plaintiffs
whose injuries are bizarre or unexpected. This is the underlying pol-
icy of the decision.
"Public policy and the social requirements do not require that
a duty be placed upon [the defendant]. . . ." The circumstance
here of plaintiff's being thrown 30 feet upon the collision with a
third person's automobile and having his leg impaled upon the pipe
was tragically bizarre and may be unique. We hold -that the re-
mote possibility of the occurrence did not give rise to a legal duty
on the part of the Village to the plaintiff to provide against his in-
jury.81
This holding has erected an effective barrier between an injured plain-
tiff and a sympathetic jury. That barrier is the scrutinizing eye of a
trial judge who, under the rubric of duty, shall determine whether
plaintiff's case will go to the jury at all. It would be naive to think
that the Cunis court was unaware of the effect that its decision will
have as precedent. Certainly it will result in more dismissals of ac-
tions prior to trial.
That policy should weigh so heavily in Cunis and many of the other
tort cases considered in this article rather than strict adherence to legal
rules and precedent should not be surprising. Negligence law is un-
like commercial or real property law.82  In these latter areas, fixed
rules and principles guide many decisions. For example, in determin-
ing whether an instrument is negotiable, a court will merely have to
inquire whether the instrument meets the requirements of negotiabil-
ity outlined in the Uniform Commercial Code. 3 In the law of con-
veyancing, when a grantee seeks to hold his grantor for breach of
warranty, whether the action can be maintained merely depends on
whether the deed contains the talismanic covenant of warranty with-
79. 7 Ill. App. 3d at 207, 287 N.E.2d at 210.
80. PaossER, p. 250, § 43.
81. 56 Ill. 2d at 377, 308 N.E.2d at 620.
82. Pound, supra note 62, at 952.
83. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, § 3-104 (1973).
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out which at common law one may not hold his grantor.84  Com-
mercial and real property law operates in this fashion since such
law forms the basis for all economic transactions which demand rules
authoritatively prescribed in advance and mechanically applied.
Negligence law, on the other hand, requires the application of rules,
not to economic transactions, but to human conduct. In negligence
cases, judges and juries are given the widest latitude in which to
make their decisions. The making of a just decision is more impor-
tant than conformity to rules.85 Facts rather than legal precepts are
important in the negligence case. If the facts indicate that it is
appropriate for the plaintiff to recover then he ought to be compen-
sated.16  Legal principles in many tort cases serve only as an after-
thought which rationalizes the original decision of the judge made on
moral, ethical or policy grounds. By its policy decision in the Cunis
case, the Supreme Court of Illinois has diminished the power of juries
to award plaintiffs verdicts.
CRITICISM
Cunis is not to be criticized because the supreme court changed
prior case law, and certainly not because it allows a trial judge wide
discretion, for these are both important components of a viable judi-
cial system. However, the decision is open to criticism on two public
policy grounds.
First, cases similar to Palsgraf and Cunis which the supreme court
terms "freakish and fantastic,' ' 7 seldom reoccur. No hard and fast
legal rule should be imposed on the parties in these unique fact situa-
tions. To do so would chafe justice. Two famous "stop, look, and
listen cases" which were presented to the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated how the imposition of an unmalleable legal rule can
lead to unjust results. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v. Goodman8 was the
first of these cases. There plaintiffs decedent was killed when the
truck he was driving was crushed by defendant's locomotive at a
grade crossing. The supreme court overturned a jury verdict for
84. Pound, supra note 62, at 947.
85. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases 11, 29 COLUM. L. Rn'. 255, 279,
281 (1929) [hereinafter cited as Green].
86. In Bessler v. Laughlin, 168 Ind. 38, 41, 79 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1907), a negligence
action, the court said:
The law is practical, and courts do not indulge in refinements and subtleties
as to causation if they tend to defeat the claims of natural justice.
87. 56 Ill. 2d at 378, 308 N.E.2d at 620.
88. 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
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plaintiff and held that decedent had been contributorily negligent as a
matter of law. The court observed that decedent had failed to stop,
look, and listen before proceeding over the tracks. The Court went
so far as to say, "In such circumstances it seems to us that if a driver
cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near he must
stop and get out of his vehicle .. ."89 Furthermore, the Court ad-
mitted it was setting down a rule to apply in all future railroad cross-
ing accident cases. "It is true . . . that the question of due care very
generally is left to the jury. But we are dealing with a standard of
conduct, and when the standard is clear it should be laid down once
and for all by the courts.""°
The Goodman decision caused much controversy and led to un-
just results. Plaintiffs would be nonsuited anytime the evidence
showed they had failed to leave their vehicles and reconnoiter, 9'
even if to have done so would have been dangerous under the cir-
cumstances. In the second case, Pokora v. Wabash Ry.,92 the
court was faced with a situation where it would have been extremely
perilous for the plaintiff to have left his vehicle and reconnoitered for
approaching trains. Under the circumstances, to hold that the plain-
tiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law would have been
most unjust. Thus, the Pokora court limited the Goodman precedent
and said that in railroad crossing accident cases, it was a jury ques-
tion whether plaintiff was exercising due care for his safety at the time
of injury.
Illustrations [of injustice] bear witness to the need for cau-
tion in framing standards of behavior 'that amount to rules of law.
The need is more urgent when -there is no background of experience
out of which the standards have emerged .... Extraordinary situ-
ations may not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations
that are fitting for the commonplace or normal. In the default of
the guide of customary conduct, what is suitable for the traveler
caught in a mesh where the ordinary safeguards fail him is for
the judgment of a jury.93
Thus, in the light of Pokora, the better view is to allow the case to
go to the jury in situations involving unforeseeable accidents. This
89. Id. at 70.
90. Id.
91. Cf. Gills v. New York, C. & St. L. R.R., 342 Ill. 455, 174 N.E. 523 (1931);
Tull v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 292 Pa. 458, 141 A. 263 (1928) (wherein recovery was
denied even though plaintiff stopped, looked, and listened, and then proceeded in appar-
ent safety).
92. 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
93. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
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view would bypass the duty issue in most cases and decide the case
on proximate cause grounds. Duty would of necessity be broadly in-
terpreted. Jackson v. B. Lowenstein & Bros.94 provides the proper
analysis:
These [Palsgraf type] cases, by virtue of the sharp differ-
ence of opinion of the judges, should be a warning to appellate
courts not lightly to assume the primary duty of determining lia-
bility or non-liability, in actions of tort, but to leave the duty
where the Constitution has placed it, with the jury, as the trier
of facts, and if they act capriciously and arbitrarily, to super-
vise their action.95
It is to be noted that if the jury does act capriciously or arbitrar-
ily the court can always overturn the verdict on a motion for a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict. Furthermore, if the jury's award of
damages is excessive, a remittitur can reduce it to a more reasonable
level. Thus, even when the case does go to the jury, the trial judge
retains final control of the matter through his supervisory powers.
The Illinois Supreme Court echoed the sentiment of the Jackson
court in the Ney case. As discussed above,96 defendant taxi cab com-
pany had left its car unattended in the street with the motor running.
Whether such an omission constituted actionable negligence when
the car was subsequently stolen and caused injury was a question
which had divided the opinions of jurists of other states.97 The court
demonstrated its awareness of the difficulty inherent in the problem
and prescribed the solution when it said:
Questions of negligence, due care and proximate cause are
ordinarily questions of fact for a jury to decide. The right of
trial by jury is recognized in the Magna Charta, our Declaration of
Independence and both our State and Federal constitutions. It
is a fundamental right in our democratic judicial system. Ques-
tions which are comprised of such qualities sufficient to cause rea-
sonable men to arrive at different results should never be deter-
mined as matters of law. The debatable quality of issues such as
negligence and proximate cause, the fact that fair minded men
might reach different conclusions, emphasize -the appropriateness
and necessity of leaving such questions to a fact-finding body. Thejury is the tribunal under our legal system to decide that type of
94. 175 Tenn. 535, 136 S.W.2d 495 (1940).
95. Id. at 538, 136 S.W.2d at 496.
96. See p. 490 supra.
97. No liability: Anderson v. Theison, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Gal-
braith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 255, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948). Liability: Lomonan v. Ideal
Towel Supply Co., 25 N.J. Misc, 162, 51 A.2d 888 (1947); Hatch v. Globe Laundry
Co., 132 Me. 379, 171 A. 387 (1934).
1975
Loyola University Law Journal
issue. To withdraw such questions from the jury is to usurp its
function.98
Cunis was no less difficult than Ney to decide; surely, more than
one inference concerning the municipality's liability was available
from the facts. Indeed, the appellate court held a jury trial was man-
dated by the evidence. The writer feels the supreme court should
have allowed Cunis to present his case to the jury. The Cunis case
standing as a precedent will be persuasive authority for lower courts
to deny a plaintiff a full trial whenever defendant's counsel can con-
vince the court that plaintiffs injury was in some manner unforesee-
able. The real fear is that Cunis, like Goodman, will have the ef-
fect of denying meritorious claims of plaintiffs whose injuries deserve
recompense.
The second policy consideration militating against the Cunis result
can be phrased as a normative question. Who should shoulder the
economic burden of loss in the unforeseeable accident case-the negli-
gent defendant or the innocent plaintiff? Prosser states that in duty
cases involving unforeseeable plaintiffs "the real problem, and the
one to which attention should be directed, would seem to be one of
social policy: whether the defendants in such cases should bear the
heavy negligence losses of a complex civilization, rather than the indi-
vidual plaintiff."' '0  Generally, when the choice is between placing
the burden of loss on a negligent defendant or an innocent plaintiff,
equity favors the latter. Two examples will suffice.
In the "stop, look, and listen" cases the courts have rejected an ear-
lier view which placed the risk of loss on the injured plaintiff. To-
day, a much broader view is taken of the scope of a railroad's liabil-
ity. A railroad, which is operated for profit, is in a much better posi-
tion to eliminate the risk of injury at crossings. Furthermore, it is more
capable, financially, of bearing the risk of loss which it has occa-
sioned. The earlier view can be said to have been the product of a
bygone era in which the courts were willing to protect an emerging
industry. 10' Again, in motorist-pedestrian accident cases, the courts
have imposed the risk of loss on the motorist unless it was clear that
the plaintiff pedestrian was not exercising due care for his own safety
at the time of the accident.10 2  Accident insurance which is readily
98. 2 111. 2d at 84, 117 N.E.2d at 80.
99. 7 I1. App. 3d at 208-09, 287 N.E.2d at 210-11.
100. PROSSER, p. 257, § 43.
101. Green, supra note 85, at 275.
102. Id. at 277.
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available to most motorists is the major factor for the imposition of
such liability.
In the instant case, the supreme court misplaced the burden of loss.
The defendant Village's conduct in allowing the pipe to protrude on
a public parkway was negligent. Indeed, in oral argument at the
appellate level, the defendant admitted it would be liable to certain
classes of plaintiffs. °3 This was the type of negligent omission
which can be expected as an inevitable consequence of attempting to
maintain a large network of streets and other public ways. This being
so, the liability imposed upon the municipality for resulting injuries can
be considered as a constituent cost of operating and maintaining such
public ways. 0 4
Viewed from yet another angle, the defendant, being a govern-
mental body, was better able to bear the economic burden of loss
since through taxes it could distribute the loss to the general public.
This "deep pocket" theory of liability can be objected to because it
requires the general public to pay for the plaintiff's injury. It means
that people who were in no way culpable will be made to bear the
loss. But this is not unusual. When insurance companies pay for
injuries and damages caused by their insureds, are they not distrib-
uting such payments to the insurance purchasing public in the form
of premiums? And when manufacturers and industrialists are forced
to pay negligence losses occasioned by their activities, do they not
distribute the payments to the general public in the form of increased
prices or alternatively decreased dividends?
In considering the public policy aspect, the fact that the defend-
ant was a municipality becomes important. The supreme court, al-
though not mentioning it, may have been influenced by the policy
supporting the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort
Immunity Act.10 5  In general, this Act grants immunity from suit to
many functions of municipal corporations and their employees. It
103. 7 Ill. App. 3d at 207, 287 N.E.2d at 209-10.
104. See generally Note, Loss Shifting and Quasi-Negligence: A New Interpretation
of the Palsgraf Case, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 729 (1941).
105. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 85, §§ 1-101 to 10-102 (1973). Section 3-102(a) states:
Except as otherwise provided in this Article, a local public entity has the
duty to exercise ordinary care to maintain its property in a reasonably safe
condition for the use in the exercise of ordinary care of people whom the entity
intended and permitted to use the property in a manner in which and at such
times as it was reasonably foreseeable that it would be used, and shall not be
liable for injury unless it is proven that it has actual or constructive notice of
the existence of such a condition that is not reasonably safe in sufficient time
prior to an injury to have taken measures to remedy or protect against such
condition.
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has been suggested'0 6 that the Illinois legislature, in passing this Act,
was motivated by a desire to safeguard tax funds from tort judg-
ments. Certainly the Act keeps the cost of government down by re-
ducing the number of claims that can be made against local govern-
mental entities. In this vein,, it has been proposed that satisfying
injury claims is not a proper use of tax revenues.
Taxes are raised for certain specific governmental purposes; and if
they could be diverted to the payment of damage claims, the more
important work of government, which every municipality must
perform regardless of its other relations, would be seriously im-
paired if not totally destroyed.10 7
The aforementioned policy, no doubt, has laudable aspects. How-
ever, that policy should not be applicable in the Cunis situation for
two reasons. First, the Act does not extend immunity to a munici-
pality's negligence in the repair and maintenance of streets and
public ways.10 8  Second, a local public entity may contract for insur-
ance against any loss or liability occasioned by its negligence. In
Cunis, liability could have been predicated under section 3-102 of
the Act which imposes a duty upon a local public entity "to maintain
its property in a reasonably safe condition .... "109 The availabil-
ity of liability insurance affords a local governmental entity an op-
portunity to shift the burden of compensating personal injury claims to
an insurance company which has contracted for such responsibil-
ity. Thus tax monies can be saved for the important governmental
106. See Comment, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal Tort
Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 265, 277-78 (1966).
107. Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist., 18 II. 2d 11, 32, 163 N.E.2d 89,
100, cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968 (1959) (Davis, J., dissenting, quoting 18 E. McQIL-
LIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 5324 (3d ed. 1949)).
The above rationale was employed in Reeves v. City of Springfield, 5 Ill. App. 3d
880, 284 N.E.2d 373 (1972). There plaintiff, a 5-year old child, was injured when he
was struck in the eye by a discarded license plate thrown by a playmate. The license
plate had been found by the children lying in a public alley. The plaintiff's theory was
that defendant municipality was liable because it had allowed a potentially dangerous in-
strumentality to remain on a public way. Plaintiff further stressed that the injury suf-
fered was a foreseeable consequence of the neglect to remove the license plate. The
court rejected these theories. It held that the injury was not foreseeable because a dis-
carded license plate, itself, is not dangerous.
Almost any object can become an instrumentality of injury when improperly
used. To require the City to devote sufficient manpower and funds to continu-
ally remove from its alleys every stick, piece of wire, tin can lid, etc., would
be to place upon it a task impossible to accomplish, and an economic burden
which the law does not impose. The "magnitude of the burden" must be taken
into account. . . . In addition this requirement would be tantamount to mak-
ing the city an insurer of the child's safety, a duty which the law does not place
upon it.
Id. at 883, 284 N.E.2d at 376.
108. See note 105 supra.
109. Id.
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services for which they were collected. If the fear is that sympathetic
juries will allow tax revenues to be depleated in injury suits, the rem-
edy should not be to deny recovery for all claims whether valid or
not. Rather, each plaintiff should be allowed to go to trial and, if his
claim is found valid, to satisfy his verdict from insurance funds.
The interest in permitting valid claims of injured plaintiffs to be sat-
isfied, in the final analysis, outweighs any interest in absolving a
negligent municipality from liability for the injuries it has caused.
Baran v. City of Chicago Heights" ° supports the proposition that
the policy underlying the Tort Immunity Act should not apply to negli-
gence actions such as Cunis. In Baran, plaintiff was injured when, at
night, his vehicle ran off a dead-end street and struck a tree. The de-
fendant municipality had failed to properly illuminate the dead-end
so as to make it visible during the night. Furthermore, it had failed
to erect any barriers or signs warning of the dead-end. The court
rejected the argument that the municipality was immune from suit in
the present action. In affirming the jury award for plaintiff, the su-
preme court said:
[W]hen a city creates a hazardous condition and someone is in-
jured as a consequence it must respond in damages, just as others
are required to do. . . . A municipal corporation like an individ-
ual or a private corporation, is required to exercise its rights and
powers with such precautions as shall not subject others to in-
jury. The rule which protects it in the exercise of its govern-
mental functions should not be construed to relieve from liability
when the plan devised, if put in operation, leaves the city's streets
in a dangerous condition for public use."'
In summary, Illinois law places the duty to repair and maintain
public streets and ways squarely on the municipality." 2  In Cunis,
the Village of LaGrange allowed a dangerous broken pipe to remain
on a public parkway. It was that pipe, not the collision of the two
cars, which caused plaintiff to lose his leg. Faced with the choice
of holding for the innocent plaintiff or the culpable defendant, the
supreme court held for the latter. In this light, the rubric of duty and
reasonable foreseeability are meaningless. Unquestionably, the de-
fendant imposed the risk; why should it not bear the consequent
loss?
THADDEUS J. HUBERT III
110. 43 I. 2d 177, 251 N.E.2d 227 (1969).
111. Id. at 181,251 N.E.2d at 229.
112. City of Elmhurst v. Buettgen, 394 Ill. 248, 68 N.E.2d 278 (1946); Koch v. City
of Chicago, 297 Il. App. 103, 17 N.E.2d 411 (1938).
1975
